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 ABSTRACT 
Since the late 1960s, the Nevada ranch community has come under increasing 
pressure from environmental groups regarding their use of public lands for livestock grazing, 
thus increasing tension between ranchers and public land managers and potentially reducing 
the social capital that facilitates action and cooperation in range management. In this paper, 
we use responses to a survey of all public grazing permit holders in Nevada to investigate the 
changing relationships between ranchers and the public land agencies, and its potential 
implications. In particular, we investigate factors that affect ranchers’ trust in the public land 
agencies, and then factors that influence the nature of the relationship between ranchers and 
the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Forest Service. Low levels of trust between 
ranchers and public managers were most significantly related to previous disagreements and 
the belief in a poor future for ranching. The occurrence of wildfire on grazing land 
contributed most significantly to increased disagreement between ranchers and public 
agencies. Finally, as a response to conflict in the ranch community, community based 
initiatives, such as grass banking, are examined for their potential to bring stakeholders 
together to realize and address common goals. Community involvement in decision making 
may increase levels of social capital, reduce transaction costs, and thus allow for more 
effective and efficient use of the range resources. 
 
Key words:  Institutions and social capital; effectiveness of range management policies 
JEL Category: O17, O52 
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Social Dilemmas and Public Range Management: 
Results from the Nevada Ranch Survey 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Economists have long been interested in factors that contribute to economic 
development. The emphasis on pure economic explanations for development – namely 
monetary and fiscal policies, and trade policy – has recently shifted to focus on the role of 
cultural, historical, social and institutional factors (Easterly 2001; North 1994; North 1990; 
Putnam 2000; Putnam 1993a; Shleifer and Vishny 1998; Woolcock 1998). Institutions and 
social capital, the features of social organizations that facilitate action and cooperation for 
mutual benefit (Putnam 1993b, pp. 35-36), are both important for economic development. In 
addition, they help resolve social dilemmas that arise when coordination of actions makes all 
parties better off compared to pursuit of activities that are only best from the perspective of 
an individual acting alone (Ostrom 2000b). In public range management, social dilemmas 
arise because private activities on the range, principally livestock grazing, create externalities 
(spillovers) that may be to the detriment of society. It is possible that institutions and social 
capital can aid in finding solutions to social dilemmas, and thus benefit the range ecosystem.  
The Nevada ranch community has increasingly come under pressure since the late 
1960s from environmental groups and public land managers because livestock grazing on 
public lands is seen as a contributing factor to the environmental degradation of public lands. 
As a result, public grazing allotments have been reduced, falling by 16% (or 473,553 AUMs) 
between 1980 and 1999 and resulting in an estimated direct annual loss of $11.6 million to 
the livestock sector (Resource Concepts Inc. 2001). While, in total numbers, Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) grazing allotments fell by more than those of the U.S. Forest Service   5
(USFS), proportionally BLM permits fell by only 14% compared to a decline of 23% for 
USFS grazing AUMs (Table 1). More than two-thirds of the AUM reductions were 
unexplained, resource-related (presumably to protect the range ecosystem, although this is 
not specified), or the result of permit violations, although the importance of these factors 
varied between the agencies.  
Table 1: Reductions in BLM and USFS Grazing Services, by Cause, 1980-1999 
BLM  U.S. Forest Service 





No reason given in the database  164,087 44 25,230  28
Resource-related 89,619 24 19,719  23
Permit violation  35,210 9 13,672  16
Change in the class of livestock  34,179 9 (1,960)  (2)
Forest Service Enhancement Act  19,189 5 –  –
Transfer of Ownership  11,863 3 5,716  7
Final Multiple Use Decision  10,485 3  
Boundary Change  9,413 3 41,517  48
Forest Service Enhancement Act  – – (17,605)  (20)
Total Reduction 






a Values in parentheses indicate an increase in grazing. 
Source: Resource Concepts Inc. (2001) 
 
Historically, ranchers and public land managers have worked together to manage and 
provide improvements to the public rangeland. However, numerous environmental laws 
enacted in the 1960s and 1970s and a shortage of funding has required public land managers 
to devote more of their time to complying with federal regulations, leaving less time for 
building relationships with ranchers (Resource Concepts Inc. 2001). Further, the most 
common response of public land managers to demands to protect non-commercial values of 
the range was to reduce AUM allocations. Yet, land managers often made range management 
decisions based on sparse information, leading to poor range decisions and systematic AUM   6
reductions (Resource Concepts Inc. 2001, pp. 62-63). This led to a reduction in social capital 
in the Nevada ranch community, particularly to a decline in trust between ranchers and the 
land agencies. Thus, little has been done cooperatively to resolve grazing problems on public 
range, with little investment in activities that increase social capital and reduce the 
transaction costs of range management. 
In contrast to most economic studies that focus on grazing fees and ranch finances, 
the purpose of the current study is to investigate the potential role that institutions and social 
capital can play in solving the social dilemmas of public range management. We might ask: 
Is there sufficient social capital in the ranch community to enable public managers to use this 
“capital” to enhance range quality and protect the habitat of endangered species? Are extant 
institutions up to the task? Are existing policies of reducing livestock grazing and investing 
in range restoration (e.g., re-seeding programs) capable of achieving the objectives of 
management (reducing fire incidence, protecting wildlife habitat, forestalling and mitigating 
range degradation), or is there another way? In this study, we address these issues using the 
results of a survey of all the public grazing permit holders in Nevada. 
We begin our task in the next section by defining what is meant by institutions and 
social capital in the context of Nevada’s ranch community, providing several hypotheses 
related to the public agencies and the community that are tested using results from the 
Nevada Ranch Survey, which is described in section 3. Survey responses are used in the 
empirical investigation of social capital, institutions and the public land agencies in section 4. 
The findings suggest that some social dilemmas related to range management can be solved 
simply by getting public land agencies to lean more on the social capital available in the 
community rather than relying on command and control. We investigate community based   7
initiatives as a means for raising social capital in section 5. Some conclusions follow in 
section 6.  
2. INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The problems of economic development and social dilemmas are not that economic 
explanations are inappropriate, but rather that they are incomplete. For a democratic market 
economy to function properly, or for market-oriented economic policies to have effect, three 
criteria or factors other than markets and private property are required, namely, economic 
institutions, the role of the state and social capital (Fukuyama 2002).  
Economic Institutions 
A country or state must have a set of institutions within which policy change can 
occur. Institutions consist of formal rules (constitutions, laws and property rights) that 
constrain political, economic and social interactions, and include such things as commercial 
and criminal courts. They also include bureaucratic agencies like the Bureau of Land 
Management and Forest Service. Unlike cultural constraints (see discussion on social 
capital), they are more amenable to change, although this might require a certain inertia to 
overcome vested interests. Economists have often ignored institutions, even though existing 
institutions may not always be the ‘right ones’ (Bromley 1999, p. 3). Recent research in 
economic development now stresses the need for good institutions, as some institutions 
retard rather than promote growth (La Porta et al. 1999), or become an obstacle to resolving 
social dilemmas. In order to remain effective, institutions need to evolve over time in 
response to changing circumstances, and the rate at which they evolve must not slow the 
progress of policy change.   8
In agriculture, the most important formal rules concern property rights over land and 
water. It is not possible, for example, to implement changes in livestock grazing on public 
land if it is not possible to enforce such changes and have the courts uphold them. Without 
the ‘right’ institutional environment, ranchers may not be concerned about how their 
activities affect the future quality of the public range. In order for ranchers to take future 
range quality into account, they most likely need to have a vested interest in the land, feel 
morally obliged to do ‘the right thing’, or somehow be ‘coerced’. Where the required 
institutions are lacking, it is not usually possible, for example, to use economic incentives to 
get ranchers to change grazing patterns and protect wildlife habitat. In the absence of 
appropriate property rights and their protection, ranchers tend to rely on personal networks 
rather than the rule of law, but this increases transaction costs relative to the situation where 
the pertinent institutions are in place.  
In many jurisdictions, arid rangelands are largely publicly owned, and ranching may, 
in some cases, be performed by state-owned enterprises or quasi-public collectives (e.g., 
Ukraine, Iran, Ethiopia). In other jurisdictions, the state may own the land and allocate its use 
to private ranchers on the basis of historical ‘rights’, subject to oversight by a public land 
management agency, as in the United States and Canada. If public land agencies become too 
rigid, or fail to evolve sufficiently to address ‘modern’ needs, then ranchers will rely on their 
informal contacts with agency personnel – their personal network – to implement 
management activities that would otherwise be held up by bureaucracy and the hierarchy that 
inevitably accompanies it. However, if ranchers cannot work with the public agencies, range 
quality may deteriorate as may the habitat of threatened or endangered species. In such cases,   9
other institutional arrangements may need to be considered, ones that yield better outcomes 
from a social viewpoint, and are also politically more acceptable.  
Role of the State 
Second, economic policies can only be carried out by the state, but the state must be 
limited in scope and yet able to enforce the rule of law. The state must be competent and 
sufficiently transparent in formulating policy, and have enough legitimacy to be able to make 
painful decisions. The role and performance of government is essential to economic 
development (La Porta et al. 1997; Olson 1996), just as it is to the resolution of social 
dilemmas in the ranch community. Good governments protect property rights and individual 
freedom, keep regulations on businesses to a minimum, provide an adequate (efficient) level 
of public goods (e.g., infrastructure, schools, health care, police protection, court system), 
and are run by bureaucrats who are generally competent and not corrupt (La Porta et al. 
1999). Unfortunately, regulatory agencies often prevent entry, courts resolve disputes 
arbitrarily and sometimes dishonestly, and politicians use government property to benefit 
their supporters rather than the population at large (Shleifer and Vishny 1998, p. 8). In the 
ranch community, such characteristics take a more subtle form: ranchers are denied access to 
historical grazing lands, decisions appear to be arbitrary as transparency disappears, and 
agency representatives hide information, often acting in their own self interest with guile 
(Williamson 1996). 
In this study, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of public agencies in providing good 
policy and minimizing bureaucracy  presents itself in the way that ranchers perceive public 
land agency staff and how disputes about land use and livestock grazing are resolved. We 
postulate that, rather than being entirely random events, disagreements between ranchers and   10
the public land agencies are a function of the personal characteristics of ranchers and of 
social capital (see below). We then test this hypothesis using the results of the Nevada Ranch 
Survey. 
Social Capital 
The third factor needed to resolve social dilemmas is social capital, or “the proper 
cultural predispositions on the part of economic and political actors” (Fukuyama 2002, p. 
24). The ‘cultural factor’ constitutes informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, 
traditions, and norms or codes of conduct) that structure political, economic and social 
interactions.
1 Informal constraints are commonly referred to as ‘social capital’, which is “the 
shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and expectations about patterns of 
interactions that groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity” (Ostrom 2000b).  
Social capital can be thought of as having an individual and an aggregate component 
(Gelauff 2003). Individual social capital consists of intrinsic aspects (charisma, values) and 
aspects in which one can invest (trustworthiness, personal networks), although the two types 
are difficult to separate. Aggregate social capital, on the other hand, constitutes the total of 
the social capital of the individuals in society, varying by form (trust in people, trust in 
government, level of participation in society), place (firm, region in a city or country, 
neighborhood), and group (ethnic and religious groups, service organizations, sport 
associations, gangs). The manner in which the social capital of individuals is aggregated is 
not clear, and therefore it is difficult for society to invest in aggregate social capital. How 
                                                 
1 Dutch society offers some excellent examples of informal sanctions. Conduct that is 
considered inappropriate is deemed ‘asocial’, with citizens quick to denounce in public one’s 
failure to follow the social graces – the expected. Thus, at a crowded counter where one is 
waiting to be served, it is asocial to go ahead of someone who arrived earlier, even though it 
requires that one be very astute as to when one arrived relative to others.    11
does a society invest in culture, except by somehow affecting individuals who do the 
investing? For example, society can encourage couples to stay together longer by making 
divorce more difficult, or encourage church attendance by providing greater tax incentives 
for charitable giving, but both actions fail to address culture directly.  
Trust is perhaps the most important component of social capital: “Virtually every 
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction 
conducted over a period of time” (Dasgupta 2000). Trust is related to institutions and affects 
the costs of transacting: If one’s confidence in an enforcement agency falters, one may not 
trust others to fulfill their agreements and thus enter into fewer agreements. There is an 
element of trust in any transaction where one has to decide (make a choice) before being able 
to observe the action of the other party to the transaction. One has to assume that the other 
person is not acting with guile, keeping information hidden that could be used to their 
advantage at the expense of the other party to the transaction. Like other components of 
social capital, trust makes an economy function more efficiently (Fukuyama 1999).  
In addition to trust, other elements of social capital include social norms, or 
behavioral strategies (always do p if q occurs) subscribed to by all in society, and networks 
of civic engagement (membership in swim clubs, church organizations, etc.) that enhance 
cooperation. Ostrom (2000a) shows how social norms of reciprocity and trust, combined with 
local enforcement and graduated sanctions result in effective resource management regimes. 
For example, irrigation systems in India, where rules were made by the local farmers, 
required less maintenance and experienced lower deadweight loss from rule violations than 
where government agencies determined water allocation and distribution.    12
In the ranch community, trust, social norms (shared beliefs) and social networks – 
social capital – are vitally important to community health and that of the range ecosystem. 
Ranchers function as stewards over the public range, performing such tasks as monitoring 
and policing trespassing and legitimate use by recreationists. As a group, ranchers are often 
better able to monitor range condition than the public land managers. They also are likely to 
have good ideas about the outcomes of various range management investments in terms of 
their impact on forage availability and the range ecosystem more broadly. Such knowledge 
can impact how public range is managed sustainably. Good relationships between ranchers 
and recreational users and the public land managers ensure that all parties benefit from the 
use of the public land. 
3. THE NEVADA RANCH SURVEY: BACKGROUND TO SOCIAL CAPITAL 
We investigate the broader role of social capital in Nevada’s ranch community by 
examining civic engagement and altruism, ranchers’ trust of the public land agencies, factors 
that affect disagreements between ranchers and the public agencies, and how disagreements 
are resolved, and how ranchers’ relationships with the BLM and USFS have changed over 
time. For this purpose, we employ responses to the Nevada Ranch Survey. 
The Nevada Ranch Survey was mailed to all 514 BLM and Forest Service grazing 
permit holders in Nevada on March 29, 2002, with a follow-up mailing to non-respondents 
on May 21, 2002. The surveys included a postage paid return envelope and cover letter. 
Follow-up telephone calls were subsequently made to all ranchers who had not responded to 
either mailing. The design and mailing procedures were based on (Dillman 2000). The 
survey was reviewed and pre-tested by University of Nevada Reno faculty members, Nevada   13
extension specialists and ranchers associated with the university. The response rate was 47.9 
percent, or 246 completed surveys (Thomsen 2002).
2 
Nevada ranchers were found to have high levels of social capital as measured by their 
involvement in community and professional activities (Table 2). This is supported by the fact 
that "civic engagement … gives rise to social capital" (Harriss and De Renzio 1997, p. 920). 
Ranchers were most active interacting with friends, donating to charity, volunteering and 
being involved in professional organizations. 
Table 2: Perceptions of Social Capital: Civic Engagement and Altruism (n=243) 
 Activity  
% of respondents indicating 
involvement in activity 
Gave blood within last year  14.4 
Did volunteer work within last year  52.3 
Donated to a charity within last year  78.1 
Regularly interact with friends  93.0 
Member of a professional organization  55.1 
Member of a service organization  14.0 
Spectator at community sporting and other events 44.4 
Engage in non-ranch activities  37.0 
Politically active  23.0 
Regular church attendee  34.2 
Member of Grazing Board  16.5 
Other community/professional involvement  15.2 
 
Factor analysis was used to reduce the large number of opinion variables in the 
survey. Factor analytic methods are useful for extracting, from a large number of variables, a 
smaller number of underlying dimensions that characterize the data. The choice of variables 
for factor analysis is made in the context of a theoretical formulation about the phenomena 
under consideration (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). Factor analysis determines whether 
there are linear combinations of variables that help identify underlying relationships in the 
                                                 
2 Lack of funding prevented us from surveying representatives of the public land agencies.   14
data (Hair, Bush and Ortinau 2000, p. 590).The new factors were used in the logit and 
ordered logit models that assessed trust, relationship strength, disagreements and 
disagreement resolution between ranchers and public land managers. The factor analysis 
results are provided in the Appendix. 
4. FACTORS AFFECTING RANCHERS’ RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BLM AND 
USFS 
The Nevada ranch survey asked how ranchers’ relationships with the public land 
agencies had changed over time. It is hypothesized that relations would have declined more 
for the USFS than BLM since public grazing was reduced to a greater relative degree by the 
former (Table 1). This is supported by the results in Table 3, which compares ranchers’ 
perceptions of how their relationships with the two agencies have changed over time, and 
how disagreements have been resolved. More respondents reported a decline in relations with 
the USFS (60%) than indicated a decline in relations with the BLM (39%). 
Not shown in Table 3 is the extent of disagreement because this was elicited using a 
more general question that was not agency specific. Over 80 percent of ranchers indicated 
that they had had one or more disagreements with the public land agencies concerning their 
use of the public range. From Table 3, more disagreements between ranchers and the BLM 
are resolved informally than is the case with the USFS, likely due to the fact that 
relationships with the BLM have not declined to the same extent as with the USFS. The 
worse relations with the USFS is also reflected, at least partly, by the fact that more 
respondents reported that disagreements were resolved formally (with lawyers getting 
involved) in the case of the USFS than the BLM. It appears that ranchers prefer to resolve 
disagreements with the local land manager, but if unsuccessful, they may trust more in the   15
potential for District/State level resolution in dealing with the BLM than with the USFS. 
Overall, it appears that relations with the BLM are better than those with the USFS. In the 
following subsections, we further investigate the factors contributing to trust and conflict 
resolution with respect to these two agencies. 
Table 3: Respondents’ Perceptions of How Their Relationships with the US Forest 
Service and BLM Changed over Time and How Disagreements have been Resolved
a 
Item USFS    BLM  significance 
  % of respondents indicating   
Change in Relationship  (n=94) (n=237)   
No change in relations  21.3 (4.2)  35.9 (3.1)  ** 
Better relations  18.1 (4.0)  24.9 (2.8)  n.s. 
Worse relations  60.6 (5.1)  39.2 (3.2)  * 
      
Resolution of Disagreements   (n=96) (n=238)   
Informal resolution  35.4 (4.9)  51.3 (3.2)  * 
District/State resolution  2.1 (1.5)  2.1 (0.9)  n.s. 
Formal resolution (including courts)  11.5 (3.3)  2.1 (0.9)  ** 
Other or multiple methods  20.8 (4.1)  21.4 (2.7)  n.s. 
No resolution specified  30.2 (4.7)  23.1 (2.7)  n.s. 
a Of respondents, 146 reported a relationship with only the BLM, 3 with only the USFS, and 
91 with both the BLM and the USFS. The latter were separated into independent responses 
for each agency, resulting in more total responses than total respondents. Responses of BLM 
permit holders with and without USFS permits were compared and found not to be 
significantly different, justifying the combination of these responses. *, ** = statistically 
significant at p < 0.10 and p < 0.05, respectively; n.s. = not statistically significant. 
 
Statistical Model 
A logit model is generally used when the dependent variable is binary, taking on a 
value of 1 (often indicating a ‘yes’ response) or 0 (‘no’ response). An ordered logit model is 
appropriate if the dependent variable is qualitative and takes the form of an ordered ranking, 
such as 1=better, 2=no change and 3=worse. In this study, we use a logit model to examine 
factors that might explain why ranchers may have had a disagreement with a public land 
agency. In particular, we want to determine whether ranchers’ perceptions of the level of   16
social capital in the ranch community translate into less conflict.
3 We employ an ordered 
logit model to determine factors affecting trust (a key component of social capital), and to 
investigate factors that have resulted in a change in the relationship between ranchers and the 
two public land agencies over time. 
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where x is a vector of explanatory variables and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
This equation calculates the likelihood that a respondent will have a disagreement with one 
of the public land agencies. 
For a three-outcome model, the ordered logit model probabilities are given by Greene 
(2000, p. 876): 
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= Λ  represents the logistic cumulative function and µ and B are vectors of 
parameters to be estimated, with µ representing critical cutoffs that separate categories. The 
estimated functions provide the likelihood that a respondent with the characteristics given by 
x will take a particular stance.  
A log-likelihood ratio test was used to determine whether variables included in the 
model are statistically necessary in the final regressions. In each iteration, the variable with 
                                                 
3 Perceptions are used because, supposedly, the level of aggregate social capital is the same 
throughout the ranch community.   17
the least statistical significance was removed from the model. This continued until the Wald 
statistic fell below a critical value of one percent significance level, in which case the 
restricted model is preferred to the general model. Only the final restricted model results are 
presented. 
Finally, for each model the marginal effects (dy/dx) of the explanatory variables are 
determined. The marginal effects enable us to identify the variables that have the greatest 
influence on the dependent variable at the margin. These are given, respectively, for the 
binary logit model and ordered logit model as by Greene (2000, pp. 815, 876-877): 
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Trust between Ranchers and the Public Land Mangers 
Trust is considered an important component of social capital. Here we use an ordered 
logit model to identify factors affecting trust. The survey asked respondents about the extent 
to which they trusted the public land managers. Respondents were asked to evaluate the 
statement: “In general I trust the public land managers and don’t have to be too careful in 
dealing with them”. A Likert scale ranging from +2 (strongly agree with statement) to –2 
(strongly disagree), with 0 being neutral, was employed. For the 241 respondents who 
answered this question, the mean opinion was –1.071 (indicating lack of trust), with a   18
standard deviation of 1.040 (indicating relative agreement among respondents), although the 
maximum and minimum responses were +2 and –2. The regression results are provided in 
Table 4. All of the estimated coefficients in the final regression model are statistically 
significant at the 10% level or better, with most significant at the 1% level. 
The level of trust in public land agencies is inversely related to two factors – the 
extent to which ranchers had disagreements with public land managers about how the range 
is utilized and the extent to which respondents were negative about the future of ranching. 
Respondents who viewed grazing as a solution to problems of a deteriorating range 
ecosystem, who were more highly educated and/or were professionally active also exhibited 
greater trust in the public land agencies. Nonetheless, as indicted earlier, overall trust in the 
public agencies was not very high. This is supported by the marginal effects, which indicate 
that the negative influences of past disagreement and the view that ranching has a ‘poor 
future’ in Nevada are greater than the positive impacts of the remaining variables.   19
Table 4: Trust between Ranchers and Public Land Managers (n=205) 
   Marginal Effects   
Proportion  responding:  0.3874 0.4189 0.1111 0.0770 0.0056   
Explanatory Variable  Estimated 
Coeff




-0.0376 0.0129 0.0128 0.0111 0.0009  3.8732
Disagreement w agency  -1.3222 
(0.0000) 




















-0.0884 0.0302 0.0300 0.0262 0.0021  0.0000
Pseudo  R
2  0.1093        
Log-likelihood  -233.7158       
Wald χ
2(5)  0.072        
a Statistical level of significance of the coefficient is provided in parentheses. 
b Education categories: grade school, high school, some college or technical school, technical 
training in the armed forces, completed college, completed some graduate classes, completed 
Masters degrees, and completed Ph.D. 
c Factors are described in the Appendix 
 
Factors Affecting Ranchers’ Disagreements with the BLM and USFS 
We use a logit model to examine factors that result in disagreements with the public 
agencies. The survey asked if the respondent ever had a disagreement with a public land 
agency, but did not distinguish between the BLM and the USFS. A ‘yes’ response was coded 
with a one and a ‘no’ response with zero. The logit regression results are provided in Table 5. 
All of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 2% level or better, except 
the coefficient on education which is significant at the 8% level. Surprisingly, younger 
ranchers were more inclined to indicate that they have had a disagreement with a public land 
agency over their use of the public range. Less surprisingly, disagreement is inversely   20
correlated with trust in the public agency, although the direction of causality cannot be 
determined.  













b  0.2314 
(0.0760) 
0.0273 3.8732 
Occurrence of wildfire  0.9419 
(0.0200) 
0.1269 0.6878 










Proportion of “yes” responses  0.807     
Pseudo  R
2  0.2246    
Log-likelihood -79.5434    
Wald χ
2(8)  4.89    
a Statistical level of significance of the coefficient is provided in parentheses. 
b See Table 4 for definition. 
c Categories 1 (“lack” of trust) to 5 (“total”) trust (see Table 4) 
 
Whether or not a rancher’s grazing allotment had been affected by wildfire is the 
most important source of disagreement between ranchers and public land managers, as 
indicated by the estimated marginal effects. What to do about wildfire and how to respond to 
it remains a contentious issue in the ranch community, as elsewhere (Pyne 1997). Probably 
the greatest source of disagreement in the Nevada ranch community concerns when cattle can 
return to a site that has burned. Public land managers generally wait two seasons before 
permitting domestic livestock on the range (Miller 1996), whereas ranchers feel that earlier 
grazing might be beneficial both financially and for the range itself.    21
Not surprisingly, wildfire is ubiquitous, with 164 out of 242 respondents to the 
Nevada Range Survey indicating that they had been affected by fire in the past twenty years. 
Ranchers reported that 250,000 acres of private land had burned in the most recent fire 
experienced by 157 respondents, while some 2,100,000 acres of public land had burned (155 
responses); thus, an average of 2,235 ac (standard deviation = 8,425 ac) of private land and 
13,300 ac (sd=24,904 ac) of public land was burned in the most recent fires experienced by 
ranchers. A total of 171,041 AUMs of grazing was reportedly lost (n=140 responses), or an 
average of 1,222 AUMs (sd=5,482 AUMs) per rancher. Some 58% of land was reseeded 
following wildfire. 
Factors Affecting Changes in Relations between Ranchers and the BLM and USFS 
For each of the BLM and USFS, survey respondents were asked whether their 
relationship with the agency had improved, remained unchanged or changed for the worse 
over time. Responses were coded so that 1 indicates a change for the worse, 2 no change, and 
3 a change for the better. The ordered logit regression results are provided in Tables 6 and 7 
for the BLM and USFS, respectively. All of the estimated coefficients in the BLM regression 
model are statistically significant at the 10% level of significance or better, while only the 
trust and disagreement variables are statistically significant in the USFS regression model. In 
both models, disagreement has soured the relationship between the rancher and agency, and 
this factor has the greatest impact on the relationship (as indicated by the marginal effect).   22
Table 6: Change in Relationship with the BLM over Time (n=200) 
   Marginal Effects   
 Relations  got:→   Worse No ∆ Better




a 1 2 3 Mean
Trust of public land managers  0.3578 
(0.0160) 0.0574 0.0267 -0.0841 1.9450
Disagreement with agency  -0.8327 
(0.0190) -0.1540 -0.0251 0.1791 0.8150
Factor ‘poor future’
b -0.6711 
(0.0000) -0.1077 -0.0500 .1578 -0.0054
Factor ‘pro-grazing’
b -0.3259 





(0.0840) 0.0411 0.0191 -0.602 0.0056
Number of years ranching  -0.2529 
(0.0150) -0.0406 -0.0189 .0594 4.6250
Pseudo R
2 0.1160 
Log  likelihood  -191.2275      
Wald χ
2(8)  2.43       
a Statistical level of significance of the coefficient is provided in parentheses. 
b Factors are described in the Appendix 
 
Table 7: Relationship with the USFS over Time 
   Marginal Effects   
 Relations  got:→  Worse No ∆ Better
Proportion responding: 0.678 0.2542 0.0979
Explanatory Variable  Estimated Coeff
a 123 M e a n
Trust of public land  managers  1.1528 
(0.0000) 
-0.2630 0.1612 0.1018 1.8272
Disagreement with agency  -1.1973 
( 0.0500) 








-0.0855 0.0524 0.0331 0.0692
Pseudo R
2 0.1978 
Log likelihood  -60.1478 
Wald χ
2(10)  4.89 
a Statistical level of significance of the coefficient is provided in parentheses. 
b Factors are described in the Appendix 
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Trust in the public agency has an effect opposite that of past disagreements – higher 
levels of trust are correlated with improved relations – although the direction of causality is 
unclear. In this regard, it should be recognized, however, that trust is a more general variable, 
referring to expressed trust in the public agencies generally as opposed to a specific agency.  
In the BLM regression model, the factors ‘poor future’ and ‘pro-grazing’ appear to 
have a negative impact on the relationship between ranchers and public land agents. That is, 
ranchers who do not think there is a future in ranching as it is currently practiced, and ones 
who view grazing of domestic animals as socially and ecologically beneficial, are more likely 
to view their relationship with the BLM to have deteriorated over time. As the number of 
years the individual has been engaged in ranching increases, so too does her view that the 
relationship with the public land agency has declined. Only those who are active in 
community service appear to view the BLM relationship in a positive light. The greater one’s 
service in the community, the more positive is one’s view of how their relation with the BLM 
has changed. Perhaps this is because those who are active in service are more likely to 
engage with representatives of public land agencies outside of the professional confines, 
thereby (inadvertently) improving the professional relationship. However, none of these 
factors is as important as disagreement in shaping the relationship between rancher and 
public land agency. 
The “social capital” and “survive” factors could not be eliminated from the USFS 
regression reported in Table 7 (according to the χ
2 tests), but neither variable is a statistically 
significant factor explaining the changing relationship between ranchers and the USFS over 
time. In addition, their marginal impacts are small. Again, disagreement is the most   24
important factor affecting relations between Nevada ranchers and the USFS, followed by 
trust in public agencies more generally. 
Given that disagreement is such an important factor, which itself is impacted greatly 
by the occurrence of wildfire (Table 5), one obvious conclusion is that wildfire is an 
important driver in the Nevada ranch community. It follows that ranchers and public land 
managers (or the agencies), as well as environmental groups, need to determine how to 
manage fire. This is a difficult if not impossible task (Pyne 1997, pp. 235-237).  
One of the things that may be required to solve social dilemmas related to public 
lands is new institutional arrangements that change the way public range is managed. New 
institutional arrangements may be able to improve response to wildfire, or enhance habitat 
for threatened species such as sage grouse. Some examples of new institutions that have 
emerged are considered next. 
5. BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSTITUTIONS  
Community based initiatives (CBIs) have arisen because of a decline in social capital 
– because of a lack of trust between ranchers and public land agents. Some CBIs dealing with 
public land have formed because of dissatisfaction, on the part of local residents, with public 
land management. This is because local residents tend to have more at stake than other 
citizens (Colburn 2002, p. 198) and locals wish to contribute to the decision-making process 
out of their knowledge, experience and intrinsic social capital. By fostering collaboration and 
working toward common interests, there is an investment in social capital, thus reducing 
resource conflicts. When CBIs find common ground between agents, trust develops.  
One means by which CBIs are working to overcome natural resource management 
conflicts is through the creation of grass banks. Grass banking is spreading throughout the   25
West as a potential way to improve range management and relationships among all parties to 
the public grazing debate. A grass bank essentially constitutes range or pasture land that 
ranchers can access if their own sources of forage are inadequate. Unlike the ‘swing 
allotment’ traditionally used by public land management agencies, a grass bank involves a 
quid pro quo – an environmental benefit must be created in order for the rancher to gain 
access to the grass bank’s forage. In some cases, a grass bank exchanges the use of its pasture 
to a rancher in return for an easement or covenant on the rancher’s own land, with the legal 
instrument (easement/covenant) stipulating that the rancher will never subdivide that land. In 
other situations, access to the grass bank’s forage is made in exchange for verifiable 
commitments to rehabilitate/restore the lands from which the cattle come – an incentive that 
enables range investment to occur without disrupting supply of forage (see Edwards 2002, 
pp. 9-10).  
The Malpai Borderlands Group (MBG) consists of ranchers, scientists and 
environmentalists (particularly The Nature Conservancy), who have forged common interests 
and now manage approximately 850,000 acres of rangeland (including the 320,000-ac Gray 
Ranch) in New Mexico and Arizona. The MBG originally began out of a concern for the 
threat of wildfires and land development. It has been able to work with public agencies on 
prescribed burns and the development of conservation easements to protect ranch lands. A 
grass bank program was developed that enables ranchers to move livestock onto grass-bank 
land during dry years in exchange for the sale of conservation easements to the MBG on 
private lands. 
Another example of a CBI is the Quivera Coalition, which brings together some 850 
ranchers, public land managers and environmentalists in New Mexico who are interested in   26
sustainable ranching and the protection of environmental amenities. The mission of the 
Quivera Coalition is “to define the core issues of the grazing conflict and to articulate a new 
position based on common interests and common sense … [and] build bridges between all 
reasonable people involved in the grazing debate, [because] … cooperation, collaboration 
and new ideas hold the key to the future of ranching and rangelands in the Southwest” 
(Gerard 2002). Workshops, demonstration projects, publications, site tours, community 
meetings and other educational forums are used to increase awareness. These activities also 
enhance social capital (Putnam 2000). The Quivera Coalition created the Valle Grande Grass 
Bank program, which is different from that of the MBG because it does not deal with the 
development threat, but the bank’s main purpose is range rehabilitation. Access to the grass 
bank is provided in exchange for a commitment to make specific range improvements, with 
cattle using the grass bank while the investment activity is undertaken.  
The experiences of successful CBIs might be of help to communities still struggling 
with resource management conflicts. Brunner and Colburn (2002) indicate that, in order for 
CBIs to be successful, innovation, diffusion and adaptation are essential. Innovation can 
create good models to guide other participants and adequate diffusion makes these 
innovations available to those who need them. Finally, adaptation allows all the available 
options to be explored and put into practice.  
What might community-based initiatives do for the range community in Nevada? 
While there is no direct evidence linking CBIs to enhanced social capital, it is likely that, by 
bringing diverse agents together to solve the social dilemma of range improvement, 
investment in social capital is also taking place. This happens because the individuals 
involved, without the influence of coercion, willingly set aside differences in order to get   27
along and cooperatively explore solutions to common problems. Thus, CBIs help build social 
capital, and, based on the results of previous sections, higher levels of trust and other forms 
of ‘social capital’ are correlated with improved relations with public land agencies, and lower 
transaction costs of implementing range improvements (Hobby and van Kooten 2003). By 
bringing ranchers, environmental groups and community interests together, the potential 
exists for developing new, perhaps unique, solutions to the conflict between the 
environmental and domestic grazing demands of the range, and to the ever-present threat of 
wildfire. Indeed, by relying on enhanced social capital, such an institution may even be able 
to identify opportunities where domestic grazing and the environment are complements, 
where grazing strategies can be used to enhance range quality and habitat for threatened 
wildlife, for example. Certainly, current arrangements seem incapable of doing so, partly 
because the solutions that are implemented lack political acceptability and may have been 
implemented too quickly without thorough scientific investigation (Resource Concepts Inc. 
2001, pp. 62-63). By their very nature, CBIs are meant to resolve the issue of political 
acceptability and increase use of scientific knowledge by reducing transaction costs of 
accessing and applying knowledge. 
6. DISCUSSION 
Nevada ranchers have suffered financially from reduced access to public grazing over 
the past 20 years. Relations with the public land agencies have also worsened, while 
disagreements over range use have affected 80 percent of the ranchers surveyed in this study. 
Disagreements appear to have come about mainly as a result of issues related to wildfire and 
its aftermath, while they in turn have had a negative impact on the relationship between 
ranchers and the public land agencies, making it increasingly difficult to solve social   28
dilemmas concerning range management. Through the application of economic theory, we 
can argue that an increase in social capital, primarily trust but also participation in 
community service and professional organizations, can benefit the ranch community by 
reducing transaction costs and increasing opportunities to resolve range management 
conflicts. However, it may also be that new institutions need to be considered, ones that are 
able to utilize the community’s resources more efficiently than is possible by relying on large 
bureaucratic agencies and their local field representatives.  
While the research reported here provides insights into the potential role of social 
capital in resolving range conflicts, more research is required. We lacked the resources to 
take the second step in this research, namely to conduct a structured interview of BLM and 
USFS field agents and representatives located in the District and State offices. Insights from 
such interviews would be helpful in determining why, for example, grazing permits have 
declined, how decisions about grazing reductions were arrived at, the importance and role of 
wildfire on range conflicts, and the potential to bring local knowledge to bear in managing 
public range. Likewise, it is necessary to go back and interview ranchers to get additional 
insights into the exact nature of range conflicts, why there are disagreements, and what local 
solutions are possible. Only by bringing together the “demand” and “supply” sides of this 
relationship using a sound socioeconomic framework will it be possible to make progress in 
resolving range conflicts. 
Finally, community involvement in range management decisions may provide a route 
to better range management, especially where such involvement is more than just tokenism. 
This is particularly the case if ranchers are to become part of the solution to range 
deterioration, and if the knowledge of ranchers is to be put to good use in making range   29
improvements work. Such investments would include fencing for better range management 
(protecting riparian areas and allowing rotational grazing), improving water development and 
delivery systems, and developing prescribed burns to better manage ecosystems. Ranchers 
can also help in monitoring range condition, including the condition of wildlife and their 
habitat, and identifying the most effective range investments. Information collected by 
ranchers can be used by researchers to evaluate range investments. None of this can be 
accomplished, however, if the level of social capital in the ranch community is depreciating, 
as may be the case in Nevada.    30
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APPENDIX: FACTOR ANALYSES  
Table A1: Factor Analysis for Civic Engagement and Altruism Opinion Questions  
Item Poor Social Alt. Ranch Pro-federal Pro- Prof Service Survive Anti- Unique-
Future Capital Income Agencies grazing Active SK ness
Donate blood 0.05194 0.56714 -0.14126 0.11803 0.06148 0.02586 0.28863 0.03728 0.02877 0.55179
Volunterism -0.05631 0.58779 0.10205 -0.07848 0.11124 0.10231 0.06285 0.01921 -0.28246 0.52781
Donate to Charity -0.07295 0.13944 0.09441 0.00434 -0.14255 0.02182 0.00801 0.00593 -0.76654 0.35783
Active with friends -0.02965 -0.00625 0.11451 0.18962 0.55952 0.0217 0.04639 -0.07473 -0.59765 0.27156
Active in prof. Orgs. -0.12885 -0.05657 0.04771 0.06784 -0.03235 0.66273 0.33766 0.18571 -0.21731 0.33733
Active in service org. -0.03352 0.07554 0.02651 0.0512 -0.00429 0.07308 0.78429 -0.00361 -0.01738 0.36906
Spectator at local events 0.09926 0.45296 0.27296 0.31254 0.27177 0.21462 -0.15279 -0.05242 0.07565 0.46105
Non-ranch activities -0.06471 0.59147 0.10207 0.04565 0.10065 -0.07586 0.43173 -0.06941 0.10057 0.41626
Politically involved 0.12231 0.37042 -0.05539 0.02233 0.11615 -0.11975 0.34025 0.11607 -0.21007 0.64306
Attend Church -0.15896 0.58943 0.08726 -0.25404 -0.13292 -0.04868 -0.21549 0.17393 -0.31333 0.36025
Grazing Board Invovement 0.01621 0.04579 -0.06514 -0.12656 0.09099 0.79255 -0.1007 -0.08739 0.08023 0.31675
Ranchers are under financial stress 0.21551 0.2631 0.04155 0.12179 0.05613 -0.05589 -0.1178 0.69274 0.15928 0.34236
Livestock are a threat to Environment -0.02865 -0.04787 -0.16402 -0.02197 0.71046 -0.03868 0.08272 0.11335 0.18858 0.408
Public Agen. Are doing good job -0.4587 0.15771 -0.02749 0.32757 -0.20753 0.239 -0.30921 -0.0947 0.03676 0.45054
Too much public land 0.00367 0.0041 0.06068 -0.78578 0.02415 0.08848 -0.09226 -0.06228 0.00624 0.35799
Fed gov. ought to control pub. Land 0.2106 0.07722 -0.02023 -0.60014 0.21384 -0.01329 0.04158 0.24594 0.1753 0.45026
Ranchers given more rights-hunting -0.0185 -0.11698 0.14493 -0.13071 0.00736 0.04229 0.1098 0.77087 -0.08957 0.33173
Grazing enhances the ecosystem 0.00159 0.13976 0.06617 -0.15482 0.76647 0.0786 -0.00854 -0.03901 -0.03387 0.35572
To many livestock are on public land -0.24462 0.03625 -0.09276 0.40764 -0.24213 -0.24597 0.03615 -0.17202 -0.04379 0.61213
Ranching won't survive the next 50 yrs 0.8025 -0.00462 -0.00596 -0.02424 -0.00812 -0.10697 -0.04357 0.05675 0.20584 0.29634
Ranchers are the soln. to range problems 0.06928 0.06353 -0.15298 -0.2371 0.49762 0.11763 -0.12318 0.39195 -0.03678 0.47994
Ranchers see no future on public lands 0.74594 -0.15142 -0.20862 0.05757 -0.0544 0.04692 0.08391 0.04602 -0.02403 0.35891
Ranching will cont. as is on public land -0.86234 -0.0727 -0.01265 0.0857 -0.00633 -0.02302 0.06497 -0.03039 0.04916 0.23545
Ranching will become hobby ranches 0.38606 -0.08324 0.51207 -0.08819 0.17618 0.10025 -0.13049 -0.06817 0.03379 0.51013
Ranching will include tourism  -0.12387 0.044 0.81375 -0.06494 -0.03362 -0.08394 0.1528 0.11687 -0.01736 0.27083
Ranching will include recreation uses -0.0506 0.065 0.81425 0.03108 -0.04935 0.02664 -0.08079 0.04109 -0.13818 0.2988  FACTOR DESCRIPTIONS: 
Poor Future– Ranchers feel that ranching has no future and won’t survive “as is” 
Social Capital – Ranchers who are involved in civic activities and are altruistic 
Alternative ranch income – Ranchers will survive by developing income from tourism, 
recreational use, and become more of a hobby than a viable ranching operation 
Pro-federal agencies – Ranchers feel that the Federal government should have more power in 
controlling and managing lands 
Pro-grazing – Ranchers feel that grazing enhances the ecosystem, grazing doesn’t negatively 
impact endangered species, and that ranchers are the solution, not the problem to range 
degradation 
Professional Activity – Ranchers are involved in cattlemen’s associations and are on grazing 
boards 
Service – Ranchers are involved in community service organizations like Elks/Lion’s clubs, 
and are involved in community activities like sports, municipal boards etc. 
Survive – Ranchers generally feel they are under financial stress and they believe they should 
be given greater rights to generate income from tourism and hunting  
Anti–SK (Social Capital) – Ranchers who are not financial contributors to community 
organizations and do not have friends over or are very socially involved. 